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HE growth of multi-employer bargaining' has been accompanied by
increased litigation regarding the legality of the so-called multi-employ.
er "defensive" lockout, i.e., a lockout by the unstruck members of
a multi-employer bargaining unit, who are subject to an express or implied
strike threat, in response to a strike called against one or more members of their
group after an impasse in negotiations for a master contract. Although such a
lockout may raise anti-trust questions, 2 as well as questions under the TaftHartley Act, recent litigation has arisen exclusively under the Taft-Hartley
Act. This litigation has made only one thing clear: The NLRB, according to the
reviewing courts, is always wrong. Thus the initial position taken by a majority
of the Board (pre-Eisenhower), that defensive lockouts are illegal under the
P

3
Taft-Hartley Act, was rejected by the courts of appeals in three circuits. A new
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xFor estimates of the number of employees involved consult Collective Bargaining with
Associations and Groups of Employers, 64 Monthly Lab. Rev. 397,398 (1947); Collective Bargaining Structures: The Employer Bargaining Unit, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1953). The
former is discussed in Pierson, Prospects for Industry-Wide Bargaining, 3 Indust. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 341, 360 (1950).
2The author plans to discuss these questions in a forthcoming issue of this Review.
3Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F. 2d 576 (C.A. 7th, 1951) [remanding first
Board decision, 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), for a determination of whether the employers intended a discharge, which would have been illegal, as opposed to a lockout of their employees,
which the court considered legal], 204 F. 2d 529 (C.A. 7th, 1953) [affirming second Board
decision, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), on ground that there was substantial evidence of discharge], cert. denied 346 U.S. 909 (1953); Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F. 2d 435 (C.A. 9th, 1952)
[remanding Davis Furniture Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 279 (1951), for a determination of the Board's
position as to the legality of a defensive lockout], 205 F. 2d 355 (C.A. 9th, 1953) [reversing
Board's holding in Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952), that defensive lockout
was illegall; NLRB v. Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 220 F. 2d 673 (C.A. 8th, 1955) [rev'g 103
N.L.R.B. 1516 (1953)]; NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F. 2d 427 (C.A. 8th, 1955)
[rev'g 104 N.L.R.B. 143 (1953)1.
In Spalding Avery, the Board, after generally reasserting the illegality of defensive lockouts, urged also that the lockout there involved was not "defensive" because the association
and its members had agreed to the union's request to engage in individual bargaining, and
that as a result the employers had no collective interest to protect by a lockout. See 103
N.L.R.B. 1516, 1521-22 (1953). Chairman Herzog, although dissenting in the second Board
decision in the Leonard case, supra, was apparently moved by this questionable argument and
did not dissent. The Eighth Circuit, urging that the union had repudiated its request by
striking prior to any individual negotiations, rejected the Board's contention as "put[ting] a
premium on sharp practice." 220 F. 2d 673, 676 (C.A. 8th, 1955).
In Continental Baking Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 143 (1953), the Board found, as a separate ground
for illegalizing a multi-employer lockout, that there had been no reasonable likelihood that the
union would have struck against each of the employers since the impasse had involved an
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Board majority (post-Eisenhower), in the Buffalo Linen4 case, reversed the
Board's initial position, but on review the Second Circuit, with one judge dissenting, again reversed the Board.'
The foregoing litigation reflects disagreement, not only as to the legality of
the multi-employer defensive lockout, but also as to whether bargaining lockouts, by an employer bargaining individually should be treated differently from
multi-employer defensive lockouts. Initially, the Board drew no distinction between the two types of lockouts and proscribed'both. 7 In the Buffalo Linen case,
however, the Board, although sanctioning the defensive lockout, expressly reserved the issue of the legality of the single-employer lockout. 8 On review, the

Second Circuit, in reversing the Board's decision, found the two issues indistinguishable. Indeed, as a basis for its reversal the court relied heavily on a
concession by the Board's general counsel of "the basic principle that an employer [not part of a multi-employer group] who locks out its employees on mere
threat of, or in anticipation of, a strike is guilty of an unfair labor practice." 9
In the light of the Board's explicit reservation of this question, the general
optional and non-uniform week, pressed by the union because the only employer who had
been struck spread forty hours work over six days. The Board, on the basis of these findings,
distinguished the Leonard case on the ground that the lockout was not a measure of self-defense against a uniform demand but a sympathy lockout. 104 N.L.R.B. 143, 145 (1953). The
Eighth Circuit, on review, did not challenge the premise that anticipation of a strike for a
uniform demand was a condition of a legal multi-employer lockout but held that the Board's
findings on this score, which were contrary to the trial examiner's, were not supported by
substantial evidence. In Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), the Board declared that a strike against one member of a multi-employer unit carried with it an implied
threat of strike against all. Although not emphasized by the Board, it may be significant in
this connection that during the prior thirteen-year period the employers in Buffalo Linen had
negotiated uniform contracts with the union. NLRB brief to the Second Circuit at 6.
4 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954) (Murdock dissenting).
5Truck Drivers Local Union v. NLRB, 231 F. 2d 110 (C.A. 2d, 1956), cert. granted, No.
103,25 Law Week 3103 (Oct. 9,1956). Clark, J. and Frank, J. (who wrote the opinion) constituted the majority; Waterman, J. dissented, urging, inter alia, that the Board's specialized
judgment on questions involving multi-employer bargaining should be respected. But the
Board's experts and their judgments have been so transient and the limits of their expertise so
ill-defined that reliance thereon appears often to be a rationalization rather than a justification. But cf. Koretz, The Lockout Revisited, 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 263, 268 (1956), which
reached the author after this article had been prepared.
6 "Lockout" has frequently been defined as an employer's temporary cessation of operations
for the purpose of securing employment terms more favorable to him. But "lockout" has not
always been used with this meaning and has sometimes not been differentiated from the more
general and neutral term "shutdown." For a discussion of the variant usages of "lockout,"
consult the references collected in Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 251-52
(1953). In this article, "lockout" will be used not as a word of art but interchangeably with
"shutdown."
7See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952).
s Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (1954).
9Truck Drivers Local Union v. NLRB, 231 F. 2d 110, 113 (C.A. 2d, 1956). This concession
was made in the NLRB's brief at 9.
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counsel's concession scarcely seemed entitled to the force accorded it by the
court. 0
In view of the uncertainty as to whether these two types of lockouts are
controlled by the same rule, it seems desirable to separate two questions: First,
under the Taft-Hartley Act is an employer bargaining individually entitled to
use a lockout to break a bargaining impasse in much the same way as a union
may use a strike? If the answer to this question is, or may be, negative, the
second question is: Despite the illegality of a single-employer lockout, is there
a valid basis for sanctioning the multi-employer defensive lockout?
There is a group of cases which proscribes lockouts by individual employers
but which can be put aside because they plainly do not control the legality of
the bargaining lockout. These cases involve lockouts designed to frustrate
organizational efforts, to destroy or to undermine the bargaining representative
or to evade the duty to bargain." In such situations the basic vice is not the
lockout as such, but the fact that its purpose is plainly incompatible with the
"
rights to organize or to bargain collectively, which are protected by the statute.
These illicit lockouts are plainly distinguishable from the bargaining lockout.
The latter does not involve an attempt to evade collective bargaining or to bust
the union any more than a strike is normally intended to bankrupt the employer. The bargaining lockout is an attempt, within the framework of collec13
tive bargaining, to checkmate the union's power to strike. Its function is
10Since the question reserved by the Board was deemed crucial by the court, a remand to
the Board for an exposition of its position on that question would have been preferable to
reliance on the general counsel's concession. The general counsel, it should be noted, is not
appointed by the Board but by the President, and any determination by the general counsel
that an unfair labor practice occurred is subject to the Board's overriding authority.
11For a discussion of such cases consult 50 Col. L. Rev. 1123 (1950); Koretz, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 253-54.
""Statute" throughout refers to the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) as amended by the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (the "Taft-Hartley Act"), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 62
Stat. 1286 (1948), 63 Stat. 880 (1949), 65 Stat. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1952).
Except where amendments to the Wagner Act are relevant, the text will not distinguish between that Act and the Taft-Hartley Act.
13 This is the basic position adopted in the Morand case, 190 F. 2d 576, 582 (C.A. 7th, 1951),
204 F. 2d 529, 531 (C.A. 7th, 1953); and in the Leonard case, 197 F. 2d 435, 441 (C.A. 9th,
1952), 205 F. 2d 355 (C.A. 9th, 1953). In the second Leonard opinion, the court, although
reaffirming its previous opinion, also sought to assimilate the bargaining lockout to lockouts
prompted by economic or operational considerations. The latter are discussed at 73 infra.
The Seventh Circuit's language in both Morand opinions seemed to require an impasse,
i.e., exhaustion of "the possibilities of good faith collective bargaining with the union through
their association," as a prerequisite to a bargaining lockout. 190 F. 2d 576, 582 (C.A. 7th,
1951), 204 F. 2d 529, 531 (C.A. 7th, 1953). But since a strike appears to be permissible after
compliance with the conditions imposed by Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which do
not explicitly include an impasse, this requirement seems to be technically inconsistent with
the court's basic rationale that the lockout is the corollary of the strike. This inconsistency
could perhaps be avoided by accepting the assumption, which is, however, somewhat fanciful,
that in the absence of an impasse resort to a lockout would necessarily be prompted by anti-
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essentially the same as that of other apparently lawful arrangements designed
to counter a possible strike, such as subcontracting, renting machinery to replace strikers, or indeed a publicity campaign to dramatize the evils of allegedly
wage-induced inflation. The purpose of the lockout is, in short, to improve the
employer's bargain rather than to avoid the bargaining process.
Somewhat closer to the bargaining lockout are lockouts arising out of protected activities but sanctioned by the Board because they are prompted by
"economic" or operational reasons.' Illustrative of such reasons are financial
losses resulting from collectively bargained wage rates which could not be
negotiated downward, 14 uneconomic operations resulting from a strike in a
single department of an integrated plant,15 fear of spoilage of raw materials16 or
of customer dissatisfaction 7 if a threatened strike materialized. In such cases,
the lockout is sanctioned because it is deemed to be a response, not to the
protected activities, but to their consequences. Similar consequences could be
produced by material or manpower shortages unrelated to protected activities.
Accordingly, these cases are technically distinguishable from the bargaining
lockout which is necessarily a response to protected activities. Whether this distinction is one which should, or can effectively, be drawn is a question to which
we will return after a closer look at the cases resting on this distinction.
In Duluth Bottling,15 the Board, although intimating that a bargaining or a
defensive lockout would be illegal, held that the fear of raw-material spoilage
justified a lockout by the unstruck members of an employers' association notwithstanding that the raw materials at risk at the various plants were not
worth more than from $100.00 to $300.00,11 and that all of the members of the
union motivation. It is, moreover, arguable that a lockout, absent an impasse, involves a
failure to bargain in good faith, but in view of Section 8(b)(3) of Taft-Hartley, requiring
unions so to bargain, this argument would also be applicable to unions resorting to a bargaining strike prior to an impasse.
In any event, the question of when an impasse has been reached may prove troublesome.
Thus in Buffalo Linen, Murdock, dissenting, pointed to the trial examiner's finding that there
had been no impasse. 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 452 (1954). Although no explicit bargaining stalemate
existed in that case, the strike against one member of the employer association after intermittent negotiations with the association over a two-month period seems entitled to the same
effect as an explicit stalemate.
14 Brown-McLaren Manufacturing Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941); cf. Lengel-Fencil Co.,
8 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938) (lockout by an employer who "lost his temper" after a strike threat
held not an unfair labor practice where the employer's course of conduct precluded a finding
that the lockout was intended to discourage collective bargaining or other union activity).
See International Shoe Company, 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951) and cases cited by Koretz, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 254; cf. The Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., 105
N.L.R.B.
767 (1953).
16
Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
17
Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
18 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
19Cf. Buffalo Linen, 231 F. 2d 110, 113 (C.A. 2d, 1956), where the court said that "the
Board has held that only in unu.talcases of economic hardship" does a threat of a strike justify
a lockout. (Italics added.)
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association had simultaneously decided to close down. Similarly, in Bells Cadillac Olds,20 the Board sanctioned a lockout of automobile service and repair departments by the unstruck members of an employers' association on the ground
that the lockout was designed to avoid customer dissatisfaction from unfinished
work. The evidence, however, justified skepticism that this was the real reason
for the lockout. The employers had discussed the advisability of a general shutdown and had advised their employees not only that the prospective strike
threatened operational difficulties, but also that the strike against two association members was a strike against all. These two cases suggest that the preEisenhower Board had, for practical purposes, softened its prohibition of bargaining lockouts by its alacrity in finding that lockouts occurring after a bargaining impasse were not motivated by bargaining objectives.
Furthermore, the Board's decision in InternationalShoe2' can be interpreted
as a recognition that under certain circumstances a lockout by a single employer
may properly be used to achieve bargaining purposes. Since InternationalShoe
is difficult to reconcile with the position followed by the Board until its volteface in Buffalo Linen, it merits full discussion. In InternationalShoe the union
had conducted an organizing drive during negotiations for a new contract involving a demand for a maintenance-of-membership clause. This drive was implemented by intermittent stoppages in two departments, apparently in protest
against the presence of non-union workers. The employer thereupon shut down
the entire plant, rejected the union's proposal for an immediate reopening and
resumption of negotiations and insisted, as a condition of reopening, on both a
written no-strike pledge and an escape provision for all those who had joined
20 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951). The trial examiner, whose findings and conclusions were adopted
by the Board, stated that although there was evidence justifying the inference that the shutdown was motivated by a desire to checkmate the union's piece-meal strike strategy, the
General Counsel had not discharged his burden of showing that this motivation was operative.
The examiner gave careful attention to unsuccessful attempts, made by most of the employers prior to the lockout, to secure assurances from their employees that no strike would
occur or that, in the event of a strike, unfinished work would be completed. The examiner,
while finding no satisfactory explanation for the employers' failure to seek such assurances
directly from the union, dismissed this irregularity because of the union's previous statement
that further strikes might be called "at any minute," the strong likelihood of its knowledge
of the employers' fears of unfinished work and its failure to dispel those fears. The examiner's
approach suggests that justification of a lockout on "economic" or "operational" grounds may
well depend on employer attempts to secure assurances--and preferably from the uniondesigned to avoid such difficulties. Nevertheless, it should be observed (a) that the examiner
immunized both the employers who sought, but were denied, such assurances and the one and
smallest employer whose employees, in effect, gave such assurances orally but declined to
reduce them to writing; and (b) that in Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 NL.R.B. 1335 (1943),
there was no mention of any attempt by the employers to seek similar assurances.
A requirement that an employer seek assurances from the union designed to avoid special
economic difficulties is consistent with the "economic" justification for lockouts. But if the
right to strike means that the union is generally entitled to maximize the employer's losses by
its timing of a bargaining shutdown, the question remains whether it is consistent to permit
a lockout if union assurances designed to reduce the employer's losses are not forthcoming.
2193 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951).
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the union after a date some nineteen days prior to the first stoppage. The union
"accepted" the employer's offer, except for the escape clause.
The Board's holding that the lockout was justified initially by the integrated
character of the plant and by the need for round-the-clock operations is a conventional illustration of the "economic" rationale. But serious difficulties are
raised by the Board's further conclusions: (1) that the union's harassing tactics
justified the continuation of the lockout pending execution of a no-strike clause
and (2) that the employer's insistence on the escape-clause was not a reprisal
against the union but was apparently prompted by the employer's justifiable
belief that the clause was a necessary corrective of the union's coercive conduct,
which had "approached" a Section 8(b) violation. To support the first conclusion, the Board invoked the broad language of the Pepsi Cola case:2
[A]n employer may lawfully discontinue or reduce operations for any reason whatsoever.., provided only that the employer's action is not motivated by a purpose to interfere
with and defeat its employees' union activities.23
The Board sought to buttress both conclusions by stating:
Here the parties were engaged in a contest over economic matters. Neither sought to
undermine the other by unfair labor practices. The Union, which chose to use an
economic weapon within its control, cannot rightly complain because the employer
saw fit to follow suit. This case stands on its own facts; we are not here confronted with
and need not pass upon the right of an employer in ordinary circumstances to lay off
employees pending negotiation of a complete contract.2 4
The union's initial resort to a stoppage plainly differentiates the International
case from the bargaining lockout where the employer throws the first stone.
The union's intermittent stoppages, together with the integrated nature
of the operations are, moreover, an appealing basis for justifying a lockout designed to secure a no-strike pledge. But if the stoppages had occurred prior to
the negotiations, the language of the Board quoted above,25 as well as its general
prohibition of bargaining lockouts, suggests that the Board would not have held
the lockout privileged. Despite the fact that harassment during negotiations
may appear to be especially distasteful, 26 an employer's stake in a no-strike
- 72 N.L.R.B. 601 (1947).
23Ibid., at 602.
24 93 N.L.R.B. 907, 911 (1951). Member Murdock, concurring in the result on the basis of
the peculiar facts, complained that the broad Pepsi Cola dictum would sanction the employer's
resort to a bargaining lockout. 93 N.L.R.B. 912 (1951). Members Houston and Styles, dis-

senting, pointed to the union's willingness to sign a no-strike clause, urged that the only
bargaining issue was the escape clause and concluded that the continuation of the lockout
was a coercive attempt to defeat the union's demand on that issue. 93 N.L.R.B. 912 (1951).
2 Consult text at note 23 supra.
26
Cf. Textile Workers Union of America, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), where the Board held
that such tactics during negotiations constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith. This holding was reversed on appeal. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F. 2d (App. D.C., 1955),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 1004 (1956), grant vacated, 38 L.R.R.M. 2757 (Oct. 15, 1956).
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clause and his justification for resorting to a lockout to secure one is not necessarily greater when the harassment occurs during, rather than before, the negotiations. Accordingly, the Board's decision in InternationalShoe, which appears
to be dependent upon the timing of the harassment, is questionable and, in any
event, is not consistent with the proposition that a lockout may not be used to
achieve bargaining ends.
With respect to the employer's use of the lockout to enforce his demand for
a particular escape clause, the Board found that the union's activity was not
an unfair labor practice and failed to find that it was unprotected. Accordingly,
it is difficult to accept the conclusion that the employer's resort to the lockout
to enforce this demand was justified by the need to neutralize the union's overexuberant organizing activity. Therefore, this aspect of the case also appears to
27
involve approval of the use of the lockout for bargaining purposes.
It is plain from these cases that the Board's distinction between "economic"
and bargaining lockouts is difficult to administer. Furthermore, the similarities
between the two types of lockout seem to be more important than their differences. Both types may involve losses to employees which arise out of protected
activities and may, therefore, discourage or diminish the effectiveness of such
activities. Both types may also involve an attempt to protect the economic
integrity of the enterprise without any attempt to frustrate organizational activity or to avoid the bargaining process. The difference between these lockouts
when they both arise in the context of bargaining, namely that the bargaining
lockout is designed to reduce the union's pressure by depriving it of the initiative with respect to the timing of the shutdown while the economic lockout is
designed to avoid the consequences of the union's exercise of its initiative, seems
exceedingly slender.
The employer may make this distinction even more shadowy by choosing his
rhetoric carefully. Even though his purpose is to exert bargaining pressure, he
may contrive economic or operational reasons for his lockout. Such rationalizations are plausible because of the uncertainties and possible disruptions which
attend any strike threat. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in its second opinion in the
Leonard case,28 criticized the Board for ignoring such uncertainties, assumed
that they had prompted the lockout and assimilated the multi-employer Leonard
lockout to lockouts which had been sanctioned by the Board on "economic"
grounds.
The Board's distinction not only invites employers to contrive "economic"
or "operational" justification for what are in fact bargaining lockouts but also
27 The inconsistency between International Shoe and the Board's position in the Morand
case (that a lockout may not be used for bargaining purposes) can, of course, be explained
away because of the Board's emphasis in International Shoe on the "peculiar facts," and because none of the opinions secured a majority.
28 Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F. 2d 355 (C.A. 9th, 1953). But cf. Truck Drivers Local Union
v. NLRB, 231 F. 2d 110, 113 (C.A. 2d, 1956), relying on the general counsel's concession that
"the ordinary economic hardship occasioned by a strike does not privilege an employer to
counter a strike threat with an anticipatory lockout." NLRB brief at 9.
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invites employers preferring an immediate shutdown to provoke a strike in
order to avoid the liability which would be involved in such a lockout. Such
provocation may poison the atmosphere more than a clear-cut lockout. While
the familiar, but elusive, ideal behind mature bargaining is the subordination
of power considerations to "responsible" persuasion, the candid resort to power
may be less harmful than disingenuous tactics designed to provoke the other
side to throw the first stone. In any event, the Board, once it proscribes the bargaining lockout, would presumably be required, in order to protect the integrity
of its own processes, to inquire whether an employer had deliberately provoked
a strike. Such an inquiry would invite disingenuous evasions before the event,
cynicism after the event and substantial administrative difficulties. 29 Whether
the Board is required by the statute to adopt a rule involving such difficulties
is a question now to be examined.
The Board's argument (pre-Eisenhower) against the bargaining lockout by
a single employer has, because of the absence of cases squarely raising that
issue, been developed in cases involving multi-employer defensive lockouts. Its
argument, which was accepted by the Second Circuit in Buffalo Linen, is as
follows: Strike activity, actual or threatened, is protected activity; a lockout,
even though prompted by bargaining objectives, constitutes a reprisal against
protected activity inconsistent with both the statutory protection of the right
to strike embodied in Section 13 of the Act and the statutory objective of reducing industrial warfare.30 A bargaining lockout is, accordingly, a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 8(a)(3) of the statute.
The Board has reinforced its argument from the statute by so analyzing the
alternatives open to the employer after an impasse has been reached as to suggest that, as a matter of policy, strikes and lockouts should not be "commensurate weapons." In Davis Furniture,' the Board declared:
Faced with an impasse in bargaining, the employer still retains control of the terms of
employment so long as production continues. He is free to continue the existing terms
29 Even the legalization of the bargaining lockout will not necessarily eliminate the question
of the motivation of a lockout ostensibly designed to break a bargaining impasse. An employer
may employ such a lockout for union-busting purposes. But such purposes may also generate

a bargaining position which is calculated to, and which does, impel a union to strike at a time
when strike action would jeopardize its representative status. In either case, difficult issues of
motivation are inescapable. But it would probably be easier to determine whether or not the
employer's lockout was motivated by a desire to destroy the union than to determine whether
or not an ostensible bargaining lockout was in fact prompted by "economic" or bargaining

considerations. The history of the parties' relationship would be considerably more useful in
resolving the former question. In addition, it seems likely that cases seriously raising the
problem of whether or not an ostensible bargaining lockout was a union-busting device
would be rare whereas cases involving a bargaining lockout will almost always raise a serious
question as to the existence of an "economic" justification for the lockout.
,0 See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409,412-13 (1950), 99 N.L.R.B. 1448,
1460-65 (1952).
31100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952), quoted with approval in Buffalo Linen, 231 F. 2d 110, 114
(C.A. 2d, 1956).
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without any contract or, indeed, unilaterally to institute any previously proposed
changes in those terms. These courses of action are obviously not available to the
union. If the union resorts to an economic strike, the employer may lawfully meet the
challenge by replacing the strikers. Thus, he may continue to operate on his own terms
without any diminution of profits while the strikers suffer partial, if not complete, loss
of wages. Even if the employer is unable to get replacements to permit continued operations in the face of the strike, he is generally in no worse position than the strikers.
Both adversaries in the conflict would in such a case be under the same 2economic pressure to terminate the strike and restore the flow of wages and profits.

3

The Board's argument bristles with difficulties. What appears to be its basic
premise, that any interference with protected activity or the right to strike
regardless of the purpose behind such interference is a violation of the statute,
is plainly unacceptable. Thus the employer's right to replace economic strikers
has been recognized even though replacement interferes with and limits the right
to strike.33 The Board has gone even further and sanctioned discharge of supervisors (who were granted protection under the Wagner Act) for striking when
34
their absence involved substantial risk of serious physical damage to the plant.
Familiar precedents thus preclude the mechanical conclusion that an anticipatory lockout is illegal because it interferes with the right to strike.
Nor does the language or the legislative history of Section 13 of the Wagner
Act support this conclusion. Section 1331 did not purport affirmatively to guarantee the right to strike or to expand the scope of activities protected by Sections 7 and 8 of that Act. That section was in essence a proviso designed to make
clear that the Wagner Act, despite its provisions for elections and its stated
objective of promoting industrial peace, was not to be used as a basis for proscribing strikes. Any doubt on this score should be eliminated by the pertinent
legislative history, which shows that the section was designed to prevent a misconstruction of the statute by which strikes might have been made unlawful.3"
2

100 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1020-21 (1952).

33Consult cases cited by Waterman, J. dissenting in Buffalo Linen, 231 F. 2d 110, 119

(C.A. 2d, 1956).
31See Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 851 (1949) (Herzog and Houston dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F. 2d 652 (C.A. 7th, 1950); cf. NL1B v. Marshall
Car Wheel and Foundry Co., 218 F. 2d 409 (C.A. 5th, 1955).
*The text of Section 13 is set forth below; amendments effected by the Taft-Hartley Act
are italicized: "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to
affect
the limitations or qualificationson that right."
35 Consult H.R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 23 (1935). The desire to avoid such a
misconstruction was the stated purpose of both Section 6 of Pub. Res. No. 44, 73rd Cong. 2d
Sess., 48 Stat. 1183 (1934), from which Section 13 was derived, and earlier versions of Section
13. As to Pub. Res. No. 44, consult debates on H. 3. Res. 375, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1934)
(which became Pub. Res. No. 44), 78 Cong. Rec. 12,044 (1934). As to the earlier version of
Section 13 consult Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess.
53,1014-15 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 12,029 (1934); S. 1958,74th Cong. 1st Sess. 21 (1935). In the
debates on H. J.Res. 375, supra, Senator Walsh stated that he had been advised by Labor
Department counsel that Section 6 was unnecessary. 78 Cong. Rec. 12,044 (1934). -
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In this connection, it is also of some significance that the original bill introduced
by Senator Wagner provided in Section 5(1) that it would be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to attempt, by interference, influence, restraint,
favor, coercion, or lockout, or by any other means, to impair the right of employees guaranteed in section 4." (Italics added.) 7 Although the original bill
had proscribed a "lockout" only when it was used to defeat protected activities,
the hearings produced objections that this prohibition, while the right to strike
was protected, was unfair. 38 Subsequent bills introduced by Senator Wagner
omitted any express reference to lockouts. While this legislative history scarcely
supports the right to resort to bargaining lockouts, it does foreclose the use of
Section 13 as support for their proscription.
It is, perhaps, these difficulties in the Board's arguments from Sections 7, 8
and 13 which prompted its attempt to buttress its argument from the statute
by an examination of the alternatives, the lockout aside, open to the employer
threatened with strike action. But, there is a touch of unreality in the Board's
emphasis on the employer's right, in the event of a deadlock, to replace strikers
or, in the event of an impasse, unilaterally to institute terms previously offered
to the union. The right to replace is more often than not a purely paper right
either because of lack of qualified replacements or because its exercise would
produce bitterness, if not bloodshed. Even where the employer exercises this
right, the disruption of a trained work-force, as well as possible union attempts
at consumer boycotts and the like, scarcely admit of the Board's easy assumption that operations can continue "without any diminution of profits."
The employer's exercise of his right to institute unilateral changes in employment conditions after an impasse also involves practical difficulties. He has no
assurance that such action will avert a strike timed in accordance with union
strategy. Furthermore, an employer's "concession" of all that he is prepared to
offer without securing his demands or the withdrawal of additional union demands may interfere with the process of trading one demand off against others.
Moreover, for the employer unilaterally to grant some concessions but to withhold others solely as a bargaining counter in relation to the disputed issues
might put him in an unfavorable light with his employees and the general public.
Finally, the unilateral institution of benefits, absent a strike, may suggest that
more may be forthcoming after a strike. The employer's limited control over
employment terms is thus plainly no substitute for the stable relationship which
he seeks through negotiations and, if necessary, the lockout.
Equally unpersuasive is the Board's contention that the employer, even
though precluded from initiating a shutdown, is in no worse position than the
37Sen. 2,926, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1934). Section 4was substantially the same as Section
7 of the Wagner Act.
38Hearings, op. cit. supra note 36, at 372, 511 and 908. The objections to the lockout voiced
in the hearings were directed at its use to defeat organizational efforts or to avoid the obligations of agreements resulting from bargaining and not at its use for bargaining purposes. Consult ibid., at 38, 931.
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strikers when they initiate the recourse to economic pressure. This is not to deny
the hardship to employees resulting from any loss of employment or the danger
to precarious union organization which a strike or a lockout may produce or
aggravate. But there are no standards for comparing the impact of a shutdown
of indeterminate length on enterprises, employees and unions, respectively. At
best, such comparisons would be uncertain and impressionistic. At worst, they
would be empty sloganeering. Furthermore, the Board's easy calculus of comparative detriment ignores completely the factor of the timing of the shutdown
which may be of crucial importance in bargaining because of seasonal fluctuations in output, fluctuations in opportunities for stand-by employment and
other factors. The Board's abstract statement concerning comparative detriment is, in short, no more meaningful than a similar assertion that laid-off
employees are in no worse position than an employer who feels compelled by
his bargaining position to engage in an anticipatory lockout.
If, as the Board has urged, 9 prohibition of the bargaining lockout would
reduce the-frequency of shut-downs, such a prohibition would gain some support
from the statutory purpose of reducing industrial warfare. But any limitation
on bargaining pressures open either to an employer or to the union presumably
would, to the extent that it had any effect, influence their respective negotiating positions and their willingness to compromise. Accordingly, the impact of
the lockout prohibition on the incidence of industrial warfare is wholly conjectural.
Critics of the Board's initial position may also argue persuasively that the
more direct objectives of the Wagner Act, the protection of the employees'
interest in organization and of the process of collective bargaining, do not support the proscription of bargaining lockouts. It was the protection of "concerted activity" and the imposition of the duty to bargain which were to redress
the employees' "inequality of bargaining power." There was nothing in the
statute which required that an employer who fully accepted the idea of unionization and collective bargaining should also be deprived of initiative in the
use of economic pressure exerted solely for the objective of breaking a bargaining impasse.4 1 Prior to the Wagner Act, the bargaining lockout was not
only legal, 4' but, like the strike, was widely assumed to be one of the driving
forces behind collective bargaining.4 In view of the assumption that the lockout
was a proper concomitant of collective bargaining, the statutory blessing of
collective bargaining arguably embraced the bargaining lockout. In other words,
the common law legality of lockouts continued unless tainted by a purpose proscribed by the Act.
39Consult discussion at 77 supra.
40 Compare International Shoe (quoted in text at note 24 supra).
41

See Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 50 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908);
consult Koretz, op. cit. supra note 6, at 253.
2For references to the pertinent literature consult Koretz, op. cit. supra note 6, at 252, 268.
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As suggested above,43 the desire of an employer to forestall a shutdown at a
time when it would be peculiarly damaging, or generally to improve his bargaining position, does not involve such a purpose. A distinction between the desire
to avoid such damage and the desire to avoid spoilage of raw materials or uneconomic operations, although technically possible, is, as we have seen, extremely refined. It is, of course, possible to construe Sections 7 and 8(a) to bar the
"interference" with "protected activities" which results from a lockout. But
such a construction is a wooden one which ignores the need for balancing the
legitimate interests of the employer against those of the union-a need which
44
has been reflected in other interpretations of the statute.
The foregoing discussion has been limited to lockouts occurring after the
expiration of the waiting period prescribed by Section 8(d)(4) of the TaftHartley Act and in compliance with the other requirements of that section.
Where an employer shuts down during the waiting period, the Board will
perforce have to determine whether the shutdown is referable to bargaining
objectives or to the "economic" or operational difficulties occasioned by the
prospect of a strike. While in such situations a distinction between "economic"
and bargaining lockouts will be inevitable, the difficulties of drawing that
distinction may suggest that the occasions in which it will be decisive should
not be multiplied.
Thus far the discussion of the Board's argument (pre-Eisenhower) has not
taken account of the new and important elements added to the problem by the
Taft-Hartley Act. These elements consist of Sections 8(d)(4), 203(c), 206 and
208(a) of the statute, 46 together with the general concern about the growth of
union power which apparently was the driving force behind this legislation.
Although, as the course of litigation suggests, the problem remains a thorny
one, these new considerations warrant, I believe, the judicial dicta which have
sanctioned the bargaining lockout even in the absence of selective strikes
against a member of a multi-employer unit. These new provisions can properly
be read as impliedly recognizing that the bargaining lockout is the corollary of
the strike. 46 This is not to question either the Board's contention that the prohibition of strikes and lockouts under similar circumstances does not necessarily
mean that a lockout would be lawful whenever a strike would be, or its contenConsult discussion at 72-73 supra.
44 Consult discussion at 78 supra.
4 All of these sections, in dealing with bargaining impasses, link "strikes and lockouts."
Thus Section 8(d) in effect requires parties to a collective bargaining agreement to serve notice
of proposed termination or modification sixty days in advance thereof, and Section 8(d)(4),
the most relevant provision, requires a party desiring such termination or modification to
continue "in full force and effect, without resortingto strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." (Italics added.)
41See the Leonard cases, 197 F. 2d 435, 438-41 (C.A. 9th, 1952), 205 F. 2d 355-57 (C.A.
9th, 1953).
43
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tion that such prohibition would not necessarily serve to legalize lockouts otherwise prohibited by Section 8. But these generalities appear to miss the mark.
Contrary to the Board's assumption, it is, as we have seen, doubtful that the
lockout was proscribed by the Wagner Act. Furthermore, Section 8(d)(4) is
specifically directed at the situation of a bargaining impasse. To prohibit, as
that section does, a strike or lockout in such a context unless a condition occurs
would seem to sanction such activity where the condition is satisfied unless
there were other clear language of prohibition, which is lacking. This commonplace construction is reinforced by the fact that, even after the Wagner Act, the
prevalent assumption was that strikes and lockouts were equally permissible
48
devices for breaking a bargaining impasse.
This construction is also reinforced by the mood which lay behind, and was
reflected in, the Taft-Hartley Act. The Act arose from a general conviction that
the power of employers, vis-h-vis unions, should be increased. In the context
of bargaining this means that employers were to have greater power to cope
with, or more bluntly, to resist union demands-short of action challenging the
basic idea of free association or collective bargaining. It is true, as the Board has
urged, that the statutory purpose was to be implemented by proscribing certain
allegedly "bad practices" by labor organizations and not [except for the freespeech guarantee in Section 8(c)] by narrowing the pre-existing proscriptions
on employer conduct.4 9 But, as we have seen, it is far from clear that the bargaining lockout was proscribed by the Wagner Act. Accordingly, the larger
statutory purpose of strengthening the employer's bargaining power is plainly
relevant in interpreting the provisions of Sections 8(a), 8(d)(4) and the other
provisions which coupled strikes and lockouts. Indeed, it is difficult to suggest
a consideration which is more important.
If the bargaining lockout by a single employer is held legal under the TaftHartley Act, it will also be legal for the unstruck members of a multi-employer
unit to engage in a defensive lockout. If, however, the bargaining lockout is
prohibited to the single employer, the question remains whether the multi47See Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1018 (1952). The Board stated that "Section 8(d)(4) does not expressly sanction lockouts. While it is arguable that by forbidding
resort to lockouts under certain circumstances, it impliedly recognizes a right to lockout under
other circumstances, such an implication is not sufficient to overcome the positive and sweeping language of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Similarly, other provisions of the Act curtailingresort
to lockouts [Sections 203(c), 206 and 208(a)] do not sufficiently demonstrate congressional
intent to strike down the safeguards of employees' rights in Section 8(a)(3) and (1)."
48Consult Koretz, op. cit. supra note 6, at 252, 268. Despite the tendency of dissenters to
overstate their case, it is of some significance that minority opponents of provisions in H.R.
3020, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947), which also would have established waiting periods and other
prerequisites to strikes or lockouts, complained that "the concept of bargaining under this
statute merely imposes formalistic procedures before a strike or lock-out becomes legal....
It is, again an open invitation to industrial strife." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.
82 (1947).
49
See Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1465 (1952).
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employer defensive lockout should be treated differently. Mr. Guy Farmer,
when he was Chairman of the Board, suggested in a newspaper article, that
such employer lockouts should be sanctioned to "equalize bargaining power."' 0
Nevertheless, he was part of the Board majority in Buffalo Linen, which, while
sanctioning such lockouts, expressly reserved the question of the legality of a
bargaining lockout by a single employer." Implicit in this position is the proposition that the members of a multi-employer unit, unless they are permitted to
resort to the defensive lockout, would generally have less bargaining power than
other employers who bargain separately. Such a proposition would be meaningful only if "bargaining power" were a concept which could serve as a common
measure for different bargaining situations.
This, however, is plainly not the case and, accordingly, there appears to be
no substance to the contention implicit in ex-Chairman Farmer's position.
"Bargaining power" and "inequality of bargaining power," although sacred
phrases when unions were building up their power, have never been refined or
even workable tools of analysis. 52 Economists have long criticized these phrases, 5
without, however, affecting their cavalier use by lawyers, judges and law professors. When "inequality of bargaining power" is invoked in favor of a group,
the phrase is only a naked claim that that group should have an increase in
power relative to another group or to the rest of the community, and this
rhetoric, despite its connotation of helping the underdog, does not necessarily
support the merits of the claim.
In the context of particular collective bargaining negotiations, the measure
of bargaining power may be viewed as the relative ability of each side to inflict
damage on the other in the event of a stalemate, or it may be viewed as the
relative staying power of the contestants when they are subjected to economic
and other pressures. 4 But staying power is also in part a function of the nature
of the issues in dispute and of the consequences of capitulation or compromise
at a particular time on the economic and power interests involved. "Bargaining
power," as Professor Neil W. Chamberlain has said, "is dependent at least as
much upon what each party is seeking.. . as it is upon each party's coercive
ability."55 It is, accordingly, impossible to apply any meaningful concept of
bargaining power to abstract bargaining situations. Furthermore, each party's
11Consult 33 L.R.R.M. 100 (1954).
"i109 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (1954).
62Consult Lindbloom, "Bargaining Power" in Price and Wage Determination, 62 QJ. Econ.
396,402-403 (1948); Mason, The Monopolistic Power of Labor Unions, 79 Monthly Lab. Rev.
161, 162 (1956); compare Stigler, The Economist Plays with Blocs, XLIV Am. Econ. Rev.
(Papers and Proceedings) 7, 14 (1954).
"3Consult Stigler, op. cit. supra note 52 and Hutt, The Theory of Collective Bargaining

(1930).
54 Compare Chamberlin, The Monopoly Power of Labor, in Wright, The Impact of the
Union 168-177 (1951); Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining, c. 10, esp. 237-38 (1951).
5 Chamberlain, op. cit. supra note 54, at[236.
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capacity to resist and to inflict damage is a function of so many variables, that
"bargaining power" is not particularly useful even in a concrete case."
It is true that these difficulties with "bargaining power" could be conceded,

without negating the contention that employers as a result of their association
increase their bargaining power vis-4-vis the union. But even if this contention,
which is prevalent, were accepted, it would not justify a distinction between
single-employer and multi-employer lockouts. Such a distinction, if it is to be
predicated on bargaining power considerations, depends, as indicated above, on
the proposition that employers organized on a multi-employer basis are nevertheless weaker than other employers bargaining individually and therefore
should be granted the right to resort to defensive lockouts. This proposition has
not been verified and is scarcely verifiable without a more precise concept of
bargaining power than now exists.
Furthermore, an examination of the factors conventionally urged as the basis
for the "bargaining weakness" of the individual members of the larger unit does
not support this proposition. Among such factors are the following: (1) The
unstruck members of a larger unit are confronted with a prospect of success-ive
strikes against individual members and the possibility of successive capitulations. (2) The initial bargain with a single member of a multi-employer group
may have an almost coercive impact on subsequent negotiations with other
members of that group. Indeed, selective strike strategy will presumably be
fashioned with this purpose in mind. (3) Multi-employer bargaining, moreover,
seems to "thrive ...where employers are relatively small and highly competitive.' ' rr (4) Finally, it appears that employers associate in a multi-employer unit
because of a conviction that individually they are "weaker" than the union and
that an association will increase their bargaining power.
The foregoing factors generally operate, however, with similar force in the
context of single-employer bargaining. Thus, the individual employer may find
his hand forced by the bargain of his competitor, not to speak of "national patterns." General Motors, for example, bargains not only for itself but for Ford
and Chrysler and to some extent, perhaps, for the whole economy. The same
vicarious bargaining exists when smaller employers are bargaining individually
with a strong centralized union. This fact, incidentally, is reflected by the existence of "most favored nation clauses" in collective bargaining agreements, designed to prevent discrimination among employers. Employers bargaining individually, moreover, are often vulnerable to the same whipsawing tactics which
have been applied to the members of a large unit. In fact, individual employers
may be in a worse position than the members of a multi-employer unit, since
56Compare Chamberlin, op. cit. supra note 54, at 177; consult also discussion at 85 infra.
57Pierson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 357. Kerr and Randall, Collective Bargaining in the
Pacific Coast Pulp and Paper Industry 2-4 (1948). At the same time multi-employer arrangements of varying degrees of formality exist in apparently oligopolistic industries. Consult
Chamberlain, op. cit. supra note 54, at 163, 176 (1951).
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such employers lack whatever advantages may accrue from an agreement
among associated employers for mutual aid and for an unbroken front whether
the union presses its demands by simultaneous or successive strikes. Finally,
single-employer bargaining, which remains the numerically dominant type, involves many employers who are small and competitive and who consider themselves "weaker" than the union. If such employers bargaining alone are denied
the right to resort to a bargaining lockout, a concept of "bargaining power,"
whatever its content, scarcely justifies more favorable legal treatment for the
defensive lockout.
The difficulty with the "bargaining power" approach is also illustrated by
considering the assumption that the multi-employer unit enhances the power of
its constituent members in the light of the Board's criteria for certifying multiemployer units. These criteria presuppose that both the employers and the union
consent at least to the inception of multi-employer bargaining.1s Participants
in a power process, whether they be unions or sovereign states, do not readily
consent to arrangements which reduce their relative power. And union consent
to multi-employer bargaining raises the question of whether the assumption
that multi-employer arrangements increase the employers' bargaining power is
well founded.
It is possible, of course, that unions might consent to bargaining arrangements which would reduce their relative bargaining power vis-k-vis the employer because of the countervailing advantages said to accrue from bargaining
on a broader basis. Such bargaining enlarges the organizing task of a rival union
by requiring it to win a majority of a larger group of workers before it can displace an incumbent union. It may, moreover, be more convenient administratively because it replaces a series of single negotiations with a single set of
master negotiations. Finally, multi-employer bargaining is said to promote the
"common rule," which is a fundamental union aim. 9
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the foregoing considerations would be sufficiently important to explain union consent if that consent involved an appreciable increase in employer "bargaining power." The union's protection against
small-scale raiding is dependent on the employer's desire to continue in the
99 The necessity for this consent arises from the Board's insistence on a history of bargaining on a multi-employer basis as a prerequisite for certification of a multi-employer unit.
Consult The NLRB and Multi-Employer Units in a Competitive Economy, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 877
(1949); Jones, The NLRB and the Multiemployer Unit, 5 Lab. L. J. 34 (1954). In the absence
of such a history and the concomitant union consent, employers who insist on multi-employer
bargaining despite the union's unwillingness, would presumably be guilty of a refusal to bargain in good faith.
Section 8(b) (1)(B) of the Taft-Hartley Act, in prohibiting union restraint on an employer
in the selection of his representative, does not appear to justify the employer's insistence that
his representative also bargain simultaneously for other employers when all of the employers
do not constitute the appropriate unit.
51For a fuller discussion of factors influencing the development of multi-employer units
consult Chamberlain, op. cit. supra note 54, at c. 8.
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larger unit since the employer's right to withdraw from the larger unit has been
recognized. 0 Whether well-entrenched unions would agree to an immediate loss
in relative bargaining power for such unstable and probably unneeded protection against potential rivals is conjectural. Similarly, although multi-employer
bargaining may facilitate uniformity,61 more important for uniformity than the
scope of the bargaining unit is the scope of the union's organization and the
character of union policies. Finally, the administrative convenience of master
negotiations may be significantly offset by the need to reconcile divergent local
preferences of both employees and employers.
Skepticism about the bargaining-power consequences of the multi-employer
unit is deepened by the fact that some economists, reversing the prevalent assumption discussed above, have viewed the multi-employer unit as strengthening the union's bargaining power. 62 This contention poses the parallel dilemma
of why employers should consent to the reduction of their relative bargaining
power. Here again, other factors such as the desire of smaller employers to
spread the cost of competent professional advisors, or the desire to protect an
incumbent union against raiding, may be at work. But these factors, although
they can be related to bargaining power considerations, seem remote from them.
The dilemma of why there is mutual consent to multi-employer bargaining
may perhaps be explained by the fact that its impact on "bargaining power"
may vary with the level of the union demands. The larger unit may strengthen
the union's position by overcoming resistance to its demands prompted primarily by the fear that a competitor may make a better bargain.63 On the other
hand, the larger unit may strengthen the employers by preserving a united front
against demands deemed excessive even though they are uniformly applied.
The multi-employer unit may, moreover, be consented to because it facilitates
cooperative monopoly, with both the enterprise and the union sharing in
monopoly profits. Whatever the motivations for larger bargaining units, it
seems plain that the conventional assumption that the multi-employer unit,
acquiesced in by both parties, reduces the union's relative bargaining power, if
not paradoxical, at least involves difficulties which require further exploration.
If the foregoing difficulties in a "bargaining power" approach are accepted,
there are obvious difficulties with the Second Circuit's comment in Buffalo
Linen that there was no proof that the employers who locked out the Team60See Truck Drivers Local Union v. NLRB, 231 F. 2d 110, 114 (C.A. 2d, 1956), and
authorities cited therein.
61
"Uniformity" in the context of multi-employer bargaining is, however, a vague and often
deceptive term. Consult Kennedy, The Significance of Wage Uniformity (1949), for a discussion of varying types of wage uniformity and the conflicts among them.
6 Consult Haberler, Wage Policy, Employment, and Economic Stability, in Wright, op.
cit. supra note 54, at 41. Furthermore, while employers' spokesmen have sharply divided on the
desirability of legislative limitations on multi-employer bargaining, union spokesmen have
been unanimous, or substantially so, in opposition to such limitations or prohibitions.
63 Ibid.
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sters were "too economically weak" to stand up to a strike." One can speculate
on the kind of data which may be offered in the next case on matters such as
ability to pay, seasonal fluctuation of output, possibility of replacing strikers,
the impact of a picket line, the availability of alternative suppliers or products,
the possibility of consumers' boycotts, "hot goods" boycotts, customers' boycotts, the size and duration of strike benefits, employees' savings, stand-by employment, the proximity of the vacation and hunting seasons, etc. But it is
difficult to see what the Board or a court could do with such data. And, although
the Second Circuit intimated that proof of employer weakness would make no
difference in its result, its reservation of that question suggests the possibility
of lockout legality depending on judgments of relative bargaining power in particular situations. The difficulties of administering such a rule are too plain to
require comment.
Even though assumptions about bargaining power in connection with the
single-employer lockout and the multi-employer lockout do not justify disparate
treatment of such lockouts, two additional considerations may be urged to
justify such treatment: (1) the Board's interpretations of Section 9 of the
Wagner Act under which the Board certified multi-employer units, together
with the legislative history surrounding the re-enactment of Section 9 and
(2) the "unfairness" of permitting the union to make intermittent and opportunistic use of the multi-employer unit for bargaining purposes. In addition,
under some circumstances, the defensive lockout could be legalized by accepting
the drastic position of Reynolds (dissenting from the Board's original decision
in Moran,; ) that a selective strike designed to coerce the abandonment of a
pre-existing multi-employer unit violates the Taft-Hartley Act, and that as a
result the employers are privileged to discharge as well as to lockout employees
approving or participating in the union conduct. It is these considerations to
which we now turn.
Under the Wagner Act, the Board, by an elastic interpretation of Sections
9(b) and 2(2),66 sanctioned the establishment of multi-employer units for representation purposes where, among other things, there was a history of multi64 The court stated that "[tihe Ninth Circuit also reasoned that its decision was necessary
because a strike against any one member of an association would find that member too weak
economically to stand up [under a strike]. We seriously doubt whether mere proof of such
weakness of an employer, when threatened with a strike, justifies him in utilizing a lockout.
But we need not here consider that question. For there is no proof here, and no finding, that
any of the employers who locked out was thus economically weak. On the contrary, according
to the stipulated facts, the sole reason for the lockouts was the strike against a single member
of the association and a desire to end that strike." 231 F. 2d 110, 114 (C.A. 2d, 1956). It
should be noted that there was no proof concerning "bargaining weakness" before the Ninth

Circuit in the Leonard case, 205 F. 2d 355 (C.A. 9th, 1953).
61See 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 412 (1950).
66
Consult Freiden, The Taft-Hartley Act and Multi-Employer Bargaining 12-13,19 (1948).
Compare the doubts expressed by Senators Ball and Taft as to the statutory basis for multiemployer bargaining. 93 Cong. Rec. 4,568-69, 4,571, 4,572-73 (1947).
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employer bargaining which was consented to by both the employers and the
incumbent union. Prior to enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, attempts were
made in both the House and the Senate to limit the Board's discretion in the
establishment of such units. 67 Although the debates reflected the prevailing
controversy over the desirability of multi-employer bargaining," these attempts
failed. Opponents of such limitations urged that the growth of union power
made it necessary for smaller employers to bargain on a group basis to achieve
approximate "equality" with unions and that multi-employer bargaining was
necessary to protect individual employers against divide-and-conquer tactics, 9
i.e., to prevent the union from singling out an individual employer, securing its
demands from him and thereby setting standards for his competitors.
In the light of these reasons, the defeat of the limiting bills [together with the
provisions of Section 8(d) (4) and the related provisions of the statute mentioned
above] strongly suggests that the multi-employer defensive lockout should be
held legal under the Taft-Hartley Act.70 Otherwise, what appears to be one of
the principal purposes behind the congressional rejection of the limiting legislation-protection of employers against selective strikes-would be frustrated.
The Board, in Buffalo Linen, although it did not refer to this legislative history,
made it clear that it was attempting to achieve this congressional purpose. It
stated:
[T]he strike against the one employer necessarily carried with it an implicit threat of
future strike action against any or all of the other members of the Association. For,
the Union's action represents a similar technique of exerting economic pressure to
atomize the employer solidarity which is the fundamental aim of the multiemployer
61Section 9(f)(1), H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947), which passed the House, would
have prevented both certification of multi-employer units and certification of the same union
as the representative of employees of competing employers, unless certain rigorous conditions
were met. The amendment introduced by Senator Ball would have banned certification of a
multi-employer unit unless the employees covered were in "the same metropolitan district or
county." 93 Cong. Rec. 4,568 (1947). It was defeated by one vote. Ibid., at 4,803.
I8Consult Buffalo Linen, 231 F. 2d 110, 117 n. 13 (C.A. 2d, 1956), for reference to the relevant debate. Similar bills were introduced in later sessions without receiving such substantial
support. E.g., H.R. 7967, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952), introduced by Mr. Gwinn, and H.R.
7698, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952), a substantially identical bill introduced by Mr. Fisher. These
bills were later introduced with minor changes by Mr. Gwinn as H.R. 8449, 82d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1952), which is the so-called Gwinn-Fisher Bill. That bill is debated by Iserman, The
Labor Monopoly Problem, 38 A.B.AJ. 743 (1952), and by Kamin, The Fiction of "Labor
Monopoly," ibid., at 748.
69Consult H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 88 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 3,551, 3,633
(1947).
70
This in general was the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in the Leonard case, 197
F. 2d 435, 438 (C.A. 9th, 1952). The Court declared that "[t]he legislative history of the Act
also shows that the twelve-year effect of the enhancement of union power had created huge
unions covering vast areas, many industry wide, producing goods purchased by the public.
Congress, in permitting small employers to strengthen their positions by joining multi-employer associations, undoubtedly had in mind the power of large unions to coerce these less
financially able small employers."
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bargaining relationship. The calculated purpose of maintaining a strike against one
employer and threatening to strike others in the employer group at future times is to
cause successive and individual employer capitulations. Therefore, and in the absence
of any independent evidence of antiunion motivation, we find that the Respondent's
action in shutting their plants until termination of the strike at Frontier was defensive
7
and privileged in nature, rather than retaliatory and unlawful. '
The Second Circuit, however, in reversing the Board, gave little weight to the
foregoing aspects of the legislative history. It declared:
Multi-employer bargaining has never received the express sanction of Congress. It
would stretch the usual canons of interpretation unduly far to conclude that, in
enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress gave legislative approval to all the previous
72
Board rulings concerning such bargaining.
And continued:
Even if we assume that it did, still the Board at that time had not gone to the extreme
lengths to which it now seeks to go in order to maintain the "stability of the employer
unit." We think Congress must have intended that such a radical innovation be left
open for consideration by the joint committee it set up under §402 of the Act to study,
among other things, "the methods and procedures for best carrying out the collective
bargaining processes, with special attention to the effect of industry-wide or regional
73
bargaining upon the national economy."
The first quoted statement is quite remote from the issue. No doubt the
failure of Congress to give express sanction to multi-employer bargaining gives
rise to a problem of construction. But, as the Second Circuit intimated in the
footnotes to its opinion, 74 the legislative history indicates76 that the 80th Con71109 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (1954). A similar recognition of the community of interest among
members of a multi-employer unit, as well as a willingness to treat a strike against one employer as the equivalent of a strike against all, is reflected in cases denying unemployment
compensation to employees locked out by unstruck employers after a selective strike. See
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 34-Cal. 2d 239, 209 P. 2d 602
(1949); Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 243 P. 2d 951 (Utah, 1952). But
cf. Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., 229 Minn. 131, 38 N.W. 2d 223 (1949). See also arbitration award in Langendorf Baking Co., 15 L.A. 234 (1950), by Sheldon D. Elliott, declaring
that a defensive lockout was not a violation of a no-lockout clause. Compare award in Intermountain Operators League, 26 L.A. 149 (1956), by Sanford H. Kadish, holding that employees locked out by unstruck employers after a selective strike were entitled to holiday pay
under a contract provision granting such pay to employees "laid-off or terminated" within the
period in which the lockout occurred.
72231 F. 2d 110, 117-18 (C.A. 2d, 1956).
7 Ibid., at 118.
74

Ibid.
75Consult H.R. Rep. No. 510 (on H.R. 3,020), 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 32 (1947). "The treatment in the Senate amendment of the term 'employer' for the purpose of section 9 (b) is
omitted from the conference agreement, since it merely restates the existing practice of the
Board in the fixing of bargaining units containing employees of more than one employer, and
it is not thought that the Board will or ought to change its practice in this respect." Consult
also Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1947) (on Sen. 1,126) and Sen. Min. Rep. No.
105,80th Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1947). Sen. 1,126 would have changed the definition of "employer"
for representation purposes by adding the following: "Provided, That for the purposes of
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gress "did not intend" to interfere with the Board's established practices regarding multi-employer bargaining. If, as the legislative history also indicates,
the purpose behind the Congressional action was to protect the multi-employer
unit against divide-and-conquer tactics, the fact that the Board had not previously sanctioned or squarely prohibited the multi-employer defensive lockout
is of secondary significance. Such sanction by the Board, although an innovation, is not a "radical innovation" but one which seems faithful to the pertinent
and recent legislative history.
The second consideration which may serve to distinguish the multi-employer
lockout from the single-employer lockout depends on a judgment as to expectancies of the parties when they consent to bargaining on the basis of a larger
unit. Since these expectancies are influenced by assumptions as to the legality
of bargaining lockouts, this point involves an obvious danger of circular argument. Nevertheless, it is clear that one of the driving forces behind employer
consent to multi-employer bargaining is the desire to match concerted action
by employees with concerted action by employers. Indeed, it is striking how
employers have explicitly borrowed the rhetoric and the tactics which have
been used so effectively by unions: "Inequality of bargaining power," "an injury against one is an injury against all," "a strike against one is a strike against
all," etc. In view of union consent to, and the basis for legislative toleration of,
multi-employer bargaining, it would be strange to deny employers the right to
engage in unified economic pressure at the time that such concerted action
seems most necessary-when they are threatened by selective pressures whose
purpose is to bring about group capitulation in slow motion. Such a denial
might perhaps be justified if, as the Board has urged, the prohibition of the
defensive lockout would substantially reduce industrial strife. Although such a
prohibition obviously would prevent employers from expanding a selective
strike into a broader shut-down, there is no a priori basis for the Board's conclusion. The pressures open to the parties in the event of a deadlock would, as
section 9 (b) hereof, the term 'employer' shall not include a group of employers except where
such employers have voluntaily associated themselves together for the purposes of collective
bargaining." Sen. 1,126, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1947). Sen. Rep. No. 105, supra, stated that
this amendment, while embodying the Board's relevant interpretations, was to make clear
that "the Board cannot treat an employer association as an employer insofar as any individual
employer has failed to delegate the association to act as his bargaining representative or has
withdrawn authority from it to act in that capacity." It has been suggested that the rejection
of this amendment indicates that the Congress chose not to confirm the Board's power to do
what it had been doing under the old Act. Freiden, The Taft-Hartley Act and.Multi-Employer
Bargaining 18-19 (1948). But this conclusion is difficult to square with the House Conference
Report. Moreover, the gloss on the Senate amendment contained in Sen. Rep. No. 105, supra,
at 18 might have limited the Board's discretion in situations where there was no formal delegation of bargaining authority to the association and might also have been urged as a basis
for the initial designation of a multi-employer unit despite the absence of union consent. These
considerations may, accordingly, explain the rejection of the amendment. Cf. Freiden, op. cit.
supra, at 19. Furthermore, it is significant that where the Congress intended to change the
Board's established certification practices, it did so by express amendment of Section 9.
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we have seen,76 affect their respective demands and sticking points. The analogy
to the'theory of mutual deterrence in international relations is plain, and it may
be that the prospect that any industrial warfare will erupt on a wide front will
reduce, or at least not increase, the loss from shutdowns. In any event, an
empirical study of multi-employer bargaining in the San Francisco Bay Area,
which involved the use of the defensive lockout, shows that the frequency of
strikes (presumably shut-downs) was reduced, and that the man-hour days per
year lost as a result of strikes (presumably shut-downs) remained relatively
constant." It is, of course, difficult to generalize from this study.
It is true that "time lost on strikes is only one of the dimensions of the strike
problem; the extent to which the time lost is concentrated at a particular time
in a particular industry is the principal other dimension."7 8 Multi-employer
lockouts increase such concentration with the result that the same amount of
time lost in a given interval may produce greater dislocations. Nevertheless,
such concentration, when precipitated by simultaneous strikes, is accepted as
a cost of the existing framework for industrial relations. It is not easy to see
why the cost should become intolerable when it is precipitated by a joint lockout. In any event, the purpose behind the legislative toleration of multi-employer units reflects a judgment that the joint lockout should not be proscribed
even though it may produce more concentrated shutdowns.
The proscription of the lockout would not only deprive employers of the
benefit of concerted action when they need it most, but it would also permit the
union in the course of a single set of negotiations, first to squeeze all of the advantages out of bargaining with a larger unit and then opportunistically to
abandon it by the use of selective strikes. This attempt temporarily to fragment
the larger unit appears to involve a denial of the premise behind the initial recognition of the multi-employer unit-the existence of a community of interest
among the employers. On the other hand, a unified employer response in the
form of a joint lockout is entirely consistent with that premise and is not inconsistent with any justifiable assumption by union or employers consenting to
multi-employer bargaining.
In this connection it is important to note that the issue as to whether or not
the selective strike may be met with a lockout is different from the question of
whether or not, for certification purposes, the employer and the union are to
have the same right of withdrawing from the larger unit. The selective strike
against a single employer is generally an attempt by the union, not to withdraw
from the multi-employer unit, but to exploit that unit opportunistically. It is
doubtful that the employers, after such a strike, are relieved of the duty to bar76

Consult discussion at 80 supra.

77Consult Kerr and Fisher, Multiple-Employer Bargaining: The San Francisco Experience,

in Lester and Shister, Insights into Labor Issues 41 (1948).
78
Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Problem: A Positive Program, LIX J.Pol Econ. 277, 279
(1951).
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gain on a multi-employer basis,7 9 although the union's right to bargain individually with employers has been recognized. 8 In any event, the selective
strike, as in the Buffalo Linen case itself, is usually followed by a settlement on
a multi-employer basis and a continuation of bargaining on that basis."' This
factor strongly suggests that the selective strike usually is a temporary maneuver and should, therefore, not be equated with a withdrawal from or an abandonment of multi-employer bargaining.82
Such an approach lies behind the Seventh Circuit's concurrence with the ruling of the Board majority in the Morand case, 83 that the union did not violate
the Taft-Hartley Act when, after an impasse had arisen in association-wide
bargaining, it requested bargaining with individual employers and followed its
request with a selective strike. The court, however, rejected the majority's conclusion that the union, after such an impasse, was free to abandon a pre-existing
association unit and to insist on bargaining with the employers individually. 4
The court apparently treated the union's request for individual bargaining as
an invitation to the employers to exercise their right to withdraw from the asso71A protected strike does not generally relieve an employer of the duty to bargain. See
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. 2d 874 (C.A. 1st, 1941). The fact that a strike is
directed at only part of a bargaining unit would not appear to change this result.
80 See Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F. 2d 576, 581 (C.A. 7th, 1951).
81This was also the case in Morand, 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 439 (1950), and in Betts Cadillac,
96 N.L.R.B. 268, 279-80 (1951).
82 In the Buffalo Linen Case, 231 F. 2d 110, 116-17 (C.A. 2d, 1956), the Second Circuit
explicitly recognized that the legality of the defensive lockout raised a question different from
the certification question. Nevertheless, it appeared to link the two questions and criticized
the Board for not according the incumbent union the same right of withdrawal as an individual
employer. Ibid. In this connection, it is significant that the Board, in a decision subsequent to
Buffalo Linen, has held that, for certification purposes, it would not recognize an employer's
withdrawal from a multi-employer unit after negotiations on that basis had produced an agreement which had been accepted by a representative of the employer involved but which had
not been executed by a duly-authorized officer. McAnary & Welter, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. No.
165,37 L.R.R.M. 1,483 (1956) (Chairman Ledon and Member Bean, dissenting). Although the
Board did not articulate its rationale for this decision, the qualification it imposes on the
employer's right to withdraw may reflect a distaste for opportunistic withdrawals.
83 190 F. 2d 576,581-82 (C.A. 7th, 1951). Member Reynolds, vigorously dissenting from the
Board's decision, had urged that (a) the union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(B), which proscribes union restraint or coercion of an employer in his selection of bargaining representatives
and Section 8(b) (3), which proscribes refusal by a union with majority status to bargain with
"an employer"; and (b) consequently, employees participating in or approving the union's
conduct had lost the protection of the statute. Although Section 8(b)(1)(B) is susceptible of
a construction which limits its protection to the employer's choice of his bargaining personnel,
as distinguished from the bargaining unit, Reynolds pointed to legislative history and a judicial decision [Madden v. M.W.A., 79 F. Supp. 616 (D.C., 1948)] which suggest that that section, iogether with Section 8(b)(3), was designed to protect bargaining through pre-existing
multi-employer units against union pressure for individual bargaining. See Morand Bros.
Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 425-26 (1950).
84 The technical difficulties involved in the majority's rationale for this conclusion are discussed in Multi-Employer Bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 886, 893-94 (1953).

19561

LOCKOUTS UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

ciation and concluded that such a request was not inconsistent with a willingness to bargain with the association.85 It viewed the strike not as a device for
enforcing the request for individuar-bargaining, but as pressure to secure better
terms without prejudice to bargaining with the association. Since there was no
explicit refusal by the union to bargain with the association and since such bargaining occurred after the strike, this interpretation of the strike was in accord
with the realities.
There is a relationship between the court's legalization of the union's request
for individual negotiations coupled with a selective strike and its legalization of
the employers' defensive lockout. The legalization of the defensive lockout supplies an additional reason for sanctioning the union's conduct notwithstanding
that such conduct may in some situations disrupt the larger unit.,, Since such
legalization affords the employers a weapon for protecting the integrity of the
larger unit, there is less need or justification for seeking such protection by a
drastic governmental requirement that a union strike all or none of the members
of such a unit.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the union's selective pressure generally
should not be assimilated to an attempt to withdraw from the multi-employer
unit. If this suggestion is followed, the disposition of the legality of the defensive
lockout generally will not involve the question of whether or not the union's
right to withdraw from a multi-employer union should parallel the employers'
right. Nevertheless, situations may arise where the union's selective pressures
coincide with a genuine and unequivocal attempt by the union to abandon the
multi-employer unit. Accordingly, a brief examination of the basic considerations pertinent to mutual rights of withdrawal is in order.
1 To support this result, the Seventh Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court's approval
of Board decisions permitting employers, after bargaining in good faith to an impasse, unilaterally to institute benefits previously offered to, and rejected by, the union. This approval
was based on the ground that no disparagement or collective bargaining was necessarily involved. See NLRB v. Crompton Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1949). The applicability of the
Crompton Mills dictum to unilateral union action in the multi-employer context is, however,
questionable. The employer's unilateral actibn sanctioned in that case does not diminish the
union's legal right to bargain with, or to strike against, the employer. But a contract between
the union and the individual employer, which is the ostensible aim and possible result of the
union's unilateral action, would destroy the legal right of the employer or the association to
bargain, or to lockout, for the modification of the contract during its term. Consult Sections
8(d) and 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus, the union's unilateral action carries with it a greater threat of disparagement of bargaining through the association, which the Seventh Circuit
recognized as the appropriate unit, notwithstanding the impasse. Consequently, unilateral
action by the union in the Morand context is not covered by the rationale underlying the
Crompton lMills dictum.
81 Requests for individual bargaining coupled with a selective strike could be used for the
purpose of avoiding, as opposed to influencing, association bargaining. There are difficulties
in determining the union's purpose in a particular case because the union's desire for better
terms merges with its expressed desire to substitute individual bargaining for association bargaining. For example in Morand, 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 436 (1950), the employers, possibly for
tactical reasons, appeared to treat the union's request for separate negotiations as an attempt
to repudiate the multi-employer unit.
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Such an examination is complicated by the Board's persistent failure to disclose its rationale for disparate treatment despite forceful criticism of such disparity within, and outside of, the Board.87 Although the argument for equality
of treatment has its customary appeal, it involves the risk of over-simplification.
Before this argument can be appraised, a prior question must be faced: What
are the reasons for sanctioning the multi-employer unit? If, as the pertinent
legislative history suggests, 8 such units are sanctioned as an offset to union
power, unlimited rights of union withdrawal from an established unit are as
paradoxical as similar rights to an employer to abandon collective bargaining.
If, however, as the Board's certification criteria indicate, 89 multi-employer units
are recognized largely because particular units have achieved a stable labormanagement relationship, coercion, and particularly one-sided coercion, appears
to be extremely dubious because of its threat to such relationships. Further
exploration of these issues is necessary before a definitive judgment as to the
desirability of mutual withdrawal rights can be made.
We turn now to a troublesome question which may arise if multi-employer
defensive lockouts are sanctioned while single-employer lockouts are proscribed:
What kind of bargaining arrangements will be considered multi-employer for
this purpose? An obvious possibility would be to permit defensive lockouts only
in situations where a multi-employer unit would have met the Board's certification standards prior to the lockout. 90 This approach would have the virtue of
requiring formal arrangements which would generally give fair warning to all
concerned of the existence of a common interest which might be reflected in
concerted economic pressure by the employers. It would, moreover, also be consistent with the Eisenhower Board's rationale for sanctioning the defensive
lockout-namely, the need to protect the integrity of the larger unit against
fragmentation by selective strikes. 9 Finally, this approach would be consonant
with the requirement apparently imposed by the Seventh Circuit in the Morand
case, viz., that an impasse involving the appropriate bargaining unit is a prerequisite to a lawful defensive lockout. 92
It should be noted, however, that integration of certification and lockout
1TSee, e.g., dissent of Member Styles in Continental Baking Company, 99 N.L.R.B. 777,
785 (1952); Multi-Employer Bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board, op. cit.
supra note 84; Truck Drivers Local Union v. NLRB, 231 F. 2d 110 (C.A. 2d, 1956).
88 Consult discussion at 88 supra.
8
9 For a discussion of the Board's criteria consult Multi-Employer Bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board, op. cit. supra note 84, at 889; Jones, op. cit. supra note 58.
90Consult authorities cited at note 89 supra.
91Consult discussion at 88 supra.
92 Consult note 13 supra. If the right to lockout is conditioned on the existence of an
impasse, in the absence of a formal multi-employer structure an impasse between one employer
and a union would have to be imputed to another employer for the latter to be privileged to
resort to a lockout.
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criteria involves substantial difficulties. An important argument for the legality
of the defensive lockout by members of a pre-existing multi-employer unit
emphasizes that a strike against one employer threatens the common interests of
the group. Such a common interest among a group of employers is, however, not
dependent on the existence of a formal multi-employer unit. It arises primarily
from the impact of particular negotiations (which may take the form of individual bargaining) on a group of employers and from market competition among
the members of that group. Although the existence of bargaining structures
which meet the Board's certification criteria identifies that common interest,
it may plainly be as strong or stronger under other bargaining relationships.
Thus, among such criteria is participation by the associated employers in joint
bargaining negotiations for a substantial period93 as well as the uniform adoption of resulting agreements by the putative members of the larger unit. Although the Board does not require organization of the employers into a formal
association or the delegation to a bargaining committee of authority to bind
the individual employers,9 4 the requirement of participation in joint negotiations often operates to exclude from a multi-employer unit employers whose
interests are, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from those of the employers included. 91Furthermore, even where no formal association or joint bargaining of any kind is involved, there are situations where a single employer is,
for practical purposes, bargaining for a group of employers. This is strikingly
illustrated by the relationship in basic steel where bargaining leadership by a
dominant firm has been generally accepted by the industry and the union.9"
Despite the formality of individual bargaining in such situations, the bargaining
leader is as much the agent of its competitors as would be the bargaining
committee of an employers' association whose members reserve freedom to
reject the agreement negotiated by the association. While an association-wide
unit would be appropriate despite such reservations, a unit comprising the
firms in an industry which have in fact, if not in form, delegated bargaining
functions to a dominant firm would presumably not be appropriate.
The absence of any correlation between bargaining forms and the common
91See Associated Shoe Industries, 81 N.L.R.B. 224, 228-29 (1949) (Houston and Murdock
dissenting on the ground that execution of identical contracts without individual bargaining
is much more persuasive evidence of a desire to be bound by group action than is participation
in preliminary negotiations); consult also Jones, op. cit. supra note 58, at 36.
94 Consult Jones, op. cit. supra note 58, at 36 and National Labor Relations Board, Seventeenth Annual Report 72 (1952).
" This is in substance the position of the dissenters in Associated Shoe Industries, 81
N.L.R.B. 224 (1949).
96In the 1956 steel negotiations, the "Big Three," rather than U.S. Steel alone, engaged
in joint negotiations. Each company carefully stated that it reserved its freedom of action
and that the joint negotiations were at the union's request. Consult 38 L.R.R. (B.N.A.) 91
(1956). This statement may have been motivated by considerations of possible antitrust
liability.
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interest of a group of employers in what is ostensibly an individual bargain produces an awkward dilemma. Denial by the Board of the right to a defensive
lockout in the absence of certain formalities would subordinate the realities of
collective bargaining to purely formal considerations. But the Board's recognition of such a right, notwithstanding the employers' failure to comply with the
formal requirements for a multi-employer unit, would have no firm statutory
basis and would also be vulnerable to attack as inconsistent with the prohibition
of single-employer lockouts. The development of new criteria for lockout purposes would, moreover, multiply uncertainties in an area where both unions and
employers require a reasonable degree of predictability-unions because they
may wish to know whether the number of employees involved in a given shutdown could be limited; employers because a wrong guess as to when individual
bargaining may be treated, for lockout purposes, as multi-employer bargaining
subjects them to the risk of substantial back pay liability. In view of the foregoing difficulties, it seems highly unlikely that the Board would or should carve
out new criteria designed to legalize allegedly defensive lockouts by employers
who have never met the conditions for certification as a multi-employer unit.
The Board need not involve itself in such difficulties in order to allow such
employers the right to lockout to protect their joint interests. It could do so by
legalizing the single-employer lockout. Indeed, the difficulties of either adhering
to or departing from the Board's certification criteria, for lockout purposes, is
another reason against a rule which sanctions the multi-employer defensive
lockout but not the single-employer lockout. If both were sanctioned, and if
the employers' contracts expired at or about the same time, the expiration of
the sixty-day period prescribed by Section 8(d)(4)97 and the existence of an
97The requirements as to notice, bargaining and waiting period imposed by Section 8(d) (4),
apply, according to the literal terms of that section, only to a party to a collective bargaining
agreement "desiring [its] termination or modification." Consult note 45 supra. Hence it is
arguable that an employer (or a union) desiring to continue a pre-existing contract is not subject to those requirements and may resort to a 'ockout (e.g., during the waiting period) unless
such conduct is barred by other sections of the statute. For an employer successfully to make
this argument in defense of a bargaining lockout within the waiting period might, however,
involve a pyrrhic victory; for to the extent that the legalization of bargaining lockouts is
based on the provisions of Section 8(d)(4) (consult discussion at 81-82 supra), it is arguable
that the noncomplying employer should be denied privileges justified in part by reliance on
that section. In any event, to interpret Section 8(d)(4), and particularly the waiting period
provision, as inapplicable to a party desirous of continuing a pre-existing contract would
threaten the purposes of that section, viz., assuring prior to any resort to industrial warfare, a
cooling-off period during which negotiation and conciliation might operate to prevent such
strife. Accordingly, the literal argument should be rejected as unduly "technical." It should be
observed that the rejection of the argument freeing the party desiring to maintain the status
quo from Section 8(d) (4) would not mean that an employer, as a condition of a lockout, would
be required in every case to file the prescribed notices. Where the union (or the employer) has
served the prescribed notices, such notices alone would appear to be adequate to achieve the
statutory purpose, and this would seem to be true whether the employer (or the union) wished
to maintain or to change the previous contract. Nevertheless, it would appear prudent for a
party considering a strike or lockout after the waiting period to serve its own notices in order
to comply literally with Section 8(d)(4) and to avoid defects in the other party's notice.
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impasse,"8 would permit individual employers to shut down in accordance with
their own concept of their individual and joint bargaining interests. This paper
has suggested the reasons which make this result appropriate under the existing
statutory framework and under a labor policy which has evolved no general
alternative to the use of economic pressure as a means of breaking a bargaining
impasse.
POSTSCRIPT
After this article went to press, the Board's divided opinion in American
Brake Shoe99 reached the writer. In this postscript it is possible only to suggest
in a brief, cryptic and overgeneralized way why that complex opinion may be
of interest to those whose patience has brought them this far.
Aimrican Brake Shoe confronted the Board for the first time with the question of the legality of threatened and actual curtailment of operations by an
employer, beginning during negotiations for a new contract and prior to the
expiration of the waiting period for "lockouts" prescribed by Section 8(d)(4)
and extending beyond that period. The Board rejected the employer's defense
based upon the Belts Cadillacdoctrine, °0 found that the employer had violated
Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3), and imposed back-pay liability from the inception
of the lay-offs to the time of the employer's unconditional offer of reinstatement, which occurred after the expiration of the waiting period. While the
Board's result is defensible, its opinion is open to question because it did not
clearly identify or squarely face the complex of difficulties which result from the
interplay of Section 8(d)(4) and the Bets Cadillacprinciple. These difficulties
apparently led the Board to restrict Betts Cadillacwhile purporting to follow it.
While this restriction appears to have been produced by the danger that an
elastic "economic" rationale might erode the waiting period requirements of
Section 8(d)(4), the tenor of the Board's opinion invites the contention that
the restriction is to be generally applicable without regard to whether operations are curtailed during or after the waiting period. As a result, the distinction
between "economic" and bargaining lockouts has become even more murky,
and the wisdom and practicality of applying that distinction to lockouts occurring after the waiting period, which were questioned earlier in this article,' have
become even more questionable.
98Consult note 13 supra. A union, in order to avoid a defensive lockout, might attempt to
confine its bargaining to one of a group of employers, thereby avoiding an "impasse" with the
others. Employers desirous of instituting a defensive lockout might respond by attempts to
accelerate bargaining, or, in the alternative, to establish the lack of good faith bargaining by
the union. Since the Seventh Circuit's requirement of an impasse is designed to insure the exhaustion of the possibilities of good faith bargaining, the impasse requirement might be dispensed with if the union had not bargained in good faith.
9116 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 38 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1956) (member Rodgers dissenting).
100 Consult discussion at 74 supra.
101Consult discussion at 76-77 supra.

